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GIVING A VOICE TO THE SILENT MENTALLY ILL
CLIENT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE ROLE OF
COUNSEL IN THE CIVIL COMMITMENT HEARING
Donald H. Stone*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the civil commitment arena, where a mentally ill person is allegedly a
danger to the life or safety of themselves or of others and in need of in-patient
care or treatment, I there are two groups assigned to protect the people: one, the
hospital presenter,2 who is responsible for investigating and presenting evidence
and testimony at a hearing to secure admission to a psychiatric facility as an
involuntary patient/ the other, the lawyer, who represents and defends the
4
allegedly mentally ill person from such involuntary civil commitment
confinement. These are their stories.
The attorney representing a mentally ill client at the involuntary admission
hearing (IV A)5 often faces challenges in defining his role and responsibility
toward his client and the community at large. There are occasions when a
client's mental disorder makes it impossible to effectively communicate his
desires and wishes to his lawyer. The client's ability to aid his attorney in
preparing an adequate defense to the application for involuntary admission is
severely compromised. There are occasions at the civil commitment hearing
when the individual subject to the commitment is silent as a result of cognitive
impairment, which places the attorney in the position of advocating a position
without the input of the client. The hospital presenter who seeks the involuntary
confinement into the psychiatric hospital is opposed by an attorney without clear
instructions from the client as to how to proceed.
This article will discuss and analyze the attorney's role in light of the silent or
incapacitated mentally ill client. An historical perspective of the traditional role
of counsel will be examined and compared with the guardian ad litem role. The
American Bar Association (ABA) standards will be scrutinized to seek guidance
in understanding the duty an attorney owes to competently represent his client
and keep him informed as to the proceedings and abide by decisions made by the
client in the legal proceedings at hand. 6 When a client is a person under a
disability, the role and responsibility of counsel are often complex and confused,
*Professor of Law,University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A. 1974, Rutgers College; J.D., 1977,
Temple. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Sarah Oliai, a law student at the
University of Baltimore School of Law, for her legal research in the preparation of this article.
IMD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 1O-617(a) (2000).
2 MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 21.01.02(25) (2001). The presenter acts on behalf of the inpatient
facility at an IV A hearing.
3MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 10-617 (2000).
4ti t. 10, § 21.01.02(25).
Sid. § 21.01.02(13).
6 See MODEL RULES. OF PROF'L. CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2001) (stating that when a client's ability is
impaired, the lawyer should try to maintain a normal client lawyer relationship).

603

604

UMKC LA W REVIEW

[VoI.70:3

thus this article will examine court decisions addressing the constitutional right to
counsel, as well as seek guidance from state statutes addressing right to counsel
at the civil commitment hearing as to the role of counsel at the hearing.
The competency of the mentally ill client will also be explored to provide
direction to the attorney confronted with the question of client competency.
Substitute decision makers at hearings, such as family members, friends, and
assisting counsel, will be reviewed. The unusual and unique circumstances
surrounding hearings, with liberty interests and time constraints at the forefront,
make the role of counsel for the silent client of vital importance. The role of
counsel at the hearing will be compared and contrasted to similar settings, such
as criminal representation of disabled defendants and legal representation of
juveniles.
The importance of understanding the role of counsel for the incompetent
mentally ill client at a hearing is significant when it comes to the decisions to be
made on behalf of the client. Should counsel zealously advocate for release from
confinement at all costs? Does counsel attempt to act in the best interest of the
client as a substitute decision maker, or does the attorney remain neutral at the
civil commitment hearing when his client is silent on the decision of confinement
to the psychiatric hospital? The mental health concerns of the client, as well as
the safety concerns of the community at large, cannot be ignored in the equation
of civil commitment. Moreover, the vulnerability of the mentally ill population
is a consideration not to be overlooked. The prevalence of adults with serious
mental illness is estimated to be 12,200,000 adults in the United States
population, a significant portion of our nation's citizenry.7
Empirical data has been collected from attorneys representing clients in civil
commitment hearings to serve as a backdrop for elaboration and comparison of
these and other questions. Ten attorneys with vast experience at the civil
commitment venue were surveyed to obtain data and elicit opinions on various
questions relating to the silent or incapacitated client. Lawyers continue to
grapple with their role in representing the silent mentally ill client, torn between
desiring to speak on their behalf, as well as to protect their legal interests. This
article will offer recommendations regarding the role and responsibility of the
attorney in representing the mentally ill person in the civil commitment arena.
On a slightly tangential but related matter, the issue of whether a mentally ill
person facing civil commitment should be permitted to waive counsel and
proceed pro se will be addressed. The factors an administrative law judge might
consider in making a determination prior to permitting a person to proceed pro se
at a hearing will also be discussed. A significant question to ponder is whether a
mentally ill person should be prohibited from proceeding pro se because of the
unique circumstances of the hearing, considering the important liberty interests at
stake.
7Center for Mental Health Services, Mental Health, U.S., 1998 at 107. (Manderscheid, R.W., and
Henderson, M. J., eds.) DHHS Pub. No. (SMA)99-3285. Washington, DC: Supt. of Docs., U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1998 (including 10 million in the household population and 2.2 million in
institutional settings such as correctional institutions and nursing homes).
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II. STATISTICAL REVIEW OF ATTORNEY SURVEY
'The role (of counsel) should be to represent the client s stated interest, and if it
can t be determined with certainty, the advocate should assume the client desires
release. ,,8

Ten attorneys for the Office of the Public Defender of Maryland9 were
surveyed to elicit their opinions on the role of the attorney at involuntary civil
commitment hearings. to Data was collected on topics including case preparation
and client interviews, the advocacy role at the hearing, the incompetent client,
and the role and responsibility of the attorney. II
The average age of the ten surveyed attorneysl2 was fifty-one, with an
average of over twenty years of legal experience, 13 ranging from full-time
practice with the Office of the Public Defender to private practice.14 The
attorneys represent clients in both state and private psychiatric hospitais/ 5
handling an average of 110 cases per year. 16
In the course of representing a client at the IV A hearing, eighty-three percent
of attorneysl7 discuss and counsel their clients on possible alternatives to the
hearing, including postponementl 8 and voluntary admission. 19
The attorney may consider recommending a postponement to his client to
avoid the possibility of an adverse ruling from the administrative law judge
presiding at the civil commitment hearing.
Advantages of seeking a
postponement include avoiding the stigma of involuntary civil commitment,

SDonald H. Stone, Role of Attorney At Involuntary Admission Hearing Survey (2000) (reproduced
at Appendix I). The empirical study included a five-page questionnaire sent to attorneys assigned
to represent clients at involuntary civil commitment hearings in the State of Maryland with the
Office of the Public Defender. Id. The quote is that of an attorney responding to the survey.
91d.
I~D. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 10-632 (2000).
"Stone, supra, note 8.
121d. The survey included seven male and three female attorneys. Id.
131d. The data showed an average of 20.6 years in practice and 8.5 years average representing
clients at IV A hearings; see infra Appendix 2, Graph #3/4.
14Stone, supra, note 8. Some attorneys were employed full-time with the Office of the Public
Defender, others part-time, and others in private practice and assigned cases. Id.
151d.
State psychiatric hospitals include Springfield, Spring Grove, and Crownsville, and such
f.rivate hospitals as Sheppard Pratt Health Systems, Washington Adventist, and Taylor Manor.
61d. In the last 12 months, 11 0 clients were represented at IV A hearings, approximately 1,320
cases annually by the attorneys responding to the survey.
17 Stone, supra, note 8; see infra Appendix 2, Graph #8.
ISMD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN I § 1O-632(c)(1) (2000). The hearing may be postponed for good
cause for seven days. Id.
I~D. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN I § 10-609 (2000). Voluntary admission is available to persons
sixteen years or older who understand the nature of the request for admission, are capable of giving
assent and able to ask for release. Id. § 1O-609(a). See also Donald H. Stone, The Benefits of
Voluntary Inpatient Psychiatric Hospitalization: Myth or Reality, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 25, Fall
1999, at 25.
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especially if it is likely that the patient will be released from observation status
within seven days of the hearing. Discussions about the advantages and
disadvantages of seeking a postponement of the hearing require first and
foremost that the client be informed and counseled about such a decision.
However, the decision regarding a postponement and subsequently remaining in
the psychiatric hospital for up to an additional week is a determination within the
exclusive purview of the client. This resolution, however, assumes that the client
is competent to weigh all the options intelligently and make an informed
decision. When a mentally ill client is unable to comprehend the nature of the
hearing, decisions regarding postponement, even when in the client's best
interest, are difficult to make. According to the survey, 53.5% of attorneys21
discuss with the hospital presenter22 the choice of a postponement. The option of
requesting a hearing postponement on behalf of the client who is unable to
comprehend the nature of the hearing is left to the attorney representing the
client. Attorneys in this position must attempt to determine what the client would
want if capable of comprehending the nature of the hearing and act accordingly,
determine what is in the best interest of the client and proceed, or recognize and
acknowledge that the decision to seek a postponement cannot be made by anyone
other than the client.
The decision to seek a postponement of the civil commitment hearing also
becomes clouded when the client is unable or unwilling to communicate with his
attorney, making the lawyer-client relationship difficult. There are situations in
the context of the civil commitment hearing in which a client diagnosed with
schizophrenia or psychosis is delusional and distrusting of all individuals,
including the attorney. In other situations, a mentally ill client could be
experiencing catatonic behavior whereby communication is not possible. In such
situations, a lawyer's ability to obtain information in order to request or not
request a postponement of the hearing is severely compromised. Once the
decision not to seek a postponement to the hearing is made, or regardless of the
postponement option, the civil commitment hearing is at hand. As the attorney
representing the mentally ill client begins preparation for the upcoming hearing,
an impending decision must be made regarding the client's view about remaining
in the hospital or seeking immediate discharge from the hospital. At the hearing,
the hospital presenter has the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing
evidence that the individual meets each of the following elements:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

The individual has a mental disorder;
The individual needs inpatient care or treatment;
The individual presents a danger to the life or safety of
the individual or of others;

20A patient's status between the time the individual is initially confined in an inpatient facility and
the time of the civil commitment hearing is that of observation status. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, §
21.01.02(18) (200 I).
2lStone, supra note 8; see infra Appendix 2, Graph #9110.
22The hospital presenter is the individual who acts on behalf of the in-patient facility at an IV A
hearing. tit 10, § 21.01.02(25).
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The individual is unable or unwilling to be voluntarily
admitted to the facility;
There is no available less restrictive form of intervention
that is consistent with the welfare and safety of the
individual. 23

At the adversarial civil commitment hearing in which an attorney is
representing the mentally ill client who is subject to involuntary civil
commitment, decisions regarding opposing or consenting to the confinement
must be made by the client. Options include opposing the commitment and
seeking immediate release or expressing a desire to remain in the hospital either
as a voluntary or involuntary patient. When the attorney determines that his
client is unable to competently express his wishes at the hearing regarding either
remaining in the hospital or being released from the hospital, remarkably, all ten
attorneys surveyed steadfastly took the position to seek immediate discharge
from the hospital?4 This decision to seek release recognizes that there will be
instances when there is compelling evidence that release of the client from the
hospital will put the client's life or safety at risk, as well as the life or safety of
others. The role of counsel to zealously advocate for release from confinement
when the client is silent or incompetent reinforces the drastic impact that civil
commitment to a psychiatric hospital has on a person. Regardless of instances in
which the attorney may believe it is unsafe or irresponsible to release the person
from the hospital, discharge is sought/5 and especially so if the health or safety
of an individual may be jeopardized. The overwhelming reason turns on the
significant deprivation of liberty that involuntary civil commitment causes,
including loss of freedom, loss of employment, and loss of self-control and
determination. Of course, one recognizes that the administrative law judge
ultimately makes the decision at the hearing. For the attorney to uphold and
enforce the adversarial model speaks volumes for the role of counsel in
representing the silent or incompetent client at the hearing.
Only one of ten surveyed attorneys changed the decision of seeking release
from the hospital for the silent or incompetent client when clear and convincing
evidence was presented at the hearing that the client would present a danger to
the life or safety of himself or others if released. 26 In such cases, one attorney
would take a neutral position regarding release or admission to the psychiatric
hospital.27 The danger of taking a neutral position on the fundamental question
of release or retention is that the adversarial model of the civil commitment
hearing is severely compromised. No longer are there opposing positions
presented and argued to the judge, and no longer are strengths and weaknesses of
both sides of the argument articulated and argued. The risk of destruction of the
adversarial model will lead to increased psychiatric confinement, often without
23 MD.

CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN I § 1O-632(e)(2) (2000).

24Stone,
25Stone,
26Stone,
27Stone,

supra note 8; see infra Appendix 2, Graph #11.
supra note 8; see infra Appendix 2, Graph #11.
supra note 8; see infra Appendix 2, Graph #13.
supra note 8; see infra Appendix 2, Graph #13.
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strenuous OpposItIOn or demonstration of the need for such hospitalization.
When the hospital presenter and the client's attorney speak in one voice, in which
the doctor knows best and one is to ask no questions, truth is compromised. The
medical model, as opposed to the legal model, has no proper place in the civil
commitment arena.
When an attorney is unable to determine his client's view regarding retention
or release and the attorney believes the client presents a high degree of danger to
the life or safety of himself or others if released at the hearing, two of ten
attorneys surveyed would take a neutral position. 28 The proper position, although
unpopular with some psychiatrists, is to oppose hospitalization and zealously
seek release. Again, the adversarial model is called into question by twenty
percent of the surveyed attorneys.29
In addition to the merits of the civil commitment based on the enumerated
five criteria, there may be situations in which procedural irregularities exist in the
certification, notice, and hearing process. 30 Procedural violations in the admission
process may result in release at the hearing by order of the administrative law
judge if an error in the process occurred, the error in the process was substantial,
and no other available remedy was consistent with due process and the protection
of the individual's rightS. 31 Such due process violations involving notice, hearing
irregularities, or defects in the application and certification process may be
significant enough to warrant release of the patient from the hospital. 32 In
situations in which a client seeks release, the decision to raise the procedural
violations is made as part of the attorney's role to seek release. However, when
the client's views regarding release or retention are unclear or silent, and the
client presents a high degree of danger to the life or safety to himself or others if
released, the procedural violation will go unheard by the judge, unless raised by
the client's attorney. To raise a procedural violation may result in release based
not on the merits but on a procedural violation,33 which has no bearing on the
patient's need for psychiatric hospitalization. An attorney might look the other
way and not raise the procedural violation, rationalizing that his client has not
expressed a desire to be released from the hospital. A compromise, as is
expressed by one attorney, is to raise the procedural violation with the
administrative law judge but not advocate release. 34 Again, to take this position
and not seek release leads to the destruction of the adversarial model at the civil
commitment hearing. Although a client is silent or incompetent, an attorney is
responsible for demanding that all procedural protections are afforded, keeping

28Stone, supra note 8; see infra Appendix 2, Graph #14.
29Stone, supra note 8; see infra Appendix 2, Graph #14. In this question the danger is seen by the
attorney as compared to question thirteen in which the danger is presented at the IV A hearing.
3<MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 21.01.09(G)(3)(a)-(b) (2001).
3 lid.
32 See id.
331d. Procedural errors include lack of certificates, uncompleted documents and missing signatures.
34Stone, supra note 8; see infra Appendix 2, Graph #15.
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all parties honest and just. Therefore, the attorney must raise procedural
irregularities and seek release on behalf of his silent or incompetent client. 35
In a clear cut situation where the evidence presented at the hearing
demonstrates the need for hospitalization, one attorney surveyed would submit
on the record without making a closing argument,36 even though such closing
argument is guaranteed as a right of parties to the hearing. 37 Again, the risk of
submitting without making a closing argument may be viewed as failing to fulfill
the attorney's role of zealous advocacy. On the other hand, if there is no merit to
one's closing argument, to waive it may be proper.
When an attorney represents a mentally ill juvenile, additional
responsibilities come into play. For example, one issue is whether there is a
minimum age in which a client is capable of aiding his attorney in defense of the
civil commitment. Should children under the age of seven be viewed differently
from children between ages seven and fourteen, and should the opinions of
children ages fourteen through eighteen be given more credence and value? The
survey attempts to obtain the attorney's view of the role and responsibility in
representing children at the IV A hearing, specifically whether the age of the child
should have any bearing on the attorney role.
Half of the attorneys surveyed who represented children under age seven
perceived their role at the civil commitment hearing differently than when
representing an adult. 38 For children ages seven through fourteen, forty percent
of the attorneys viewed their role differently when representing a client of this
age. 39 For children ages fourteen through eighteen, two attorneys of ten surveyed
saw their role as different than when representing an adult client. 40

III. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The right to counsel for the mentally ill at an involuntary civil commitment
hearing is the cornerstone of the process of involuntary admission into a
If the mentally ill person subject to involuntary
psychiatric hospita1.41
confinement is unable to afford an attorney, an attorney is provided by the State
of Maryland through the Office of the Public Defender.42 The right is based in
large part on the United States Supreme Court decision in In re Gault,43 which
involved a fifteen year-old child committed as a juvenile delinquent to the
35 After the patient is given an opportunity to leave the in-patient facility, the treating physician may
file a petition for an emergency evaluation to initiate re-confinement. tit. 10, § 21.01.10.
36Stone, supra note 8; see infra Appendix 2, Graph #16.
37 tit.l0, § 21.01.09(C)(1)(t).
38Stone, supra note 8; see infra Appendix 2, Graph #18A.
39Stone, supra note 8; see infra Appendix 2, Graph #18B.
40 Stone, supra note 8; see infra Appendix 2, Graph #18C.
4IMD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN I § 10-631 (a)(2)-(4) (2000) (stating the rights of individuals which
include the right to consult with a lawyer and the availability of agencies for referral of individuals
who need legal counsel). See also MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 21.01.05(c)(4) (2001) (stating the
right to access to legal counsel provided in Maryland).
42MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 21.0\.06B(2)(e) (2001).
43/n Re Gault, 387 U.S. I (\967).
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Arizona State Industrial School for making lewd telephone calls.44 Justice Abe
Fortas, writing for the Court, rejected the state's claim that appointment of
counsel was discretionary and decreed that the child and his parent must be
advised of the juvenile's right to be represented by counsel chosen by them, or if
unable to afford counsel, that counsel would be appointed to represent the child. 45
The court was cognizant of the loss of liberty, as well as the stigma attached to
Gerald Gault's determination as a delinquent child as key factors in its opinion. 46
The consequences of the involuntary civil commitment include the loss of
liberty, as well as the stigma attached to forced psychiatric hospitalization.
Following the Supreme Court decision in Gault, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit expanded its mandate of the right to counsel for a mentallyretarded person committed to the Wyoming State Training School for the "feebleminded" and epileptic.47 The court recognized the liberty of an individual is at
stake, asserting that "[i]t matters not whether the proceedings be labeled 'civil' or
'criminal,' or whether the subject matter be mental instability or juvenile
delinquency. It is the likelihood of involuntary incarceration-- with [sic]
commands observance of the constitutional safeguards of due process.'48 The
court required counsel in hearings regarding confinement in facilities for the
mentally retarded, acknowledging the need for a "guiding hand of legal counsel
at every step of the proceedings.',49
Several years later, the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
announced the broad and encompassing directive of the procedural rights of
persons with mental illness in Lessard v. Schmidt. 5o The court articulated the
constitutional rights of those persons subject to involuntary confinement and
treatment, spelling out the right to counsel,51 elements of adequate assistance of
counsel,52 the significance of the adversarial nature of the role,53 and the
importance of providing counsel adequate time to prepare and review all relevant
material in the case. 54
In a class action suit filed in Maryland to establish procedures for the
involuntary commitment of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity at a
criminal trial, the court in Dorsey v. Solomon55 set forth various rights which
must be granted before the state may confine them against their wil1.56 The court
announced the right to appoint counsel at involuntary civil commitment hearings,
at 4.
at 41.
461d. at 16.
47Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
481d. at 396.
491d.
5°349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds by 414 U.S. 473 (1973).
51/d. at 1097.
521d. at 1098.
53/ d. at 1098-99.
541d. at 1099.
55435 F. Supp. 725 (D.C. Md. 1977).
561d. at 733.
44 ld.

45/d.
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recognizing that insanity acquittees face the same loss of personal liberty as civil
committees and have the same need for counsel to safeguard their interests. 57
Other courts have recognized the unique role of counsel in the civil
commitment arena by preventing a mentally ill person from discharging counsel
without a determination of the person's understanding of the ramifications of his
58
decision to proceed pro se. The court announced that before waiving right to
counsel, a determination of the respondent's understanding of the ramifications of
his decision to proceed is necessary to avoid reversible error. 59 The standard for
granting a waiver of counsel in the civil commitment hearing should be
exceedingly high.
At the civil commitment hearing, a mentally ill person facing forced
hospitalization has a significant number of decisions to make, including
converting his status to a voluntary patient,60 requesting a postponement,61 or
proceeding to a hearing. At the hearing, the right to counsel is a due process
right62 because commitment involves a substantial curtailment of liberty and,
thus, requires due process protection.63 The right to counsel may be waived if the
waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.64 Courts are skeptical about
permitting mentally ill persons facing involuntary hospitalization to waive their
right to counsel, believing it is inherently contradictory to find a respondent
severely mentally ill, yet able to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to
counse1.65 Courts require warnings, explanations, inquiries, and attention directed
at a mentally ill person's understanding, knowledge, or competence to waive
counsel and elect to represent himself.66 At an involuntary commitment hearing,
where one of the judge's central determinations is the competence of the
respondent, the court must determine the ability to make a knowing and
intelligent waiver of the right to counse1. 67 In order for a mentally ill person to
discharge counsel at the start of the hearing on a petition for involuntary
commitment, the court is required to determine such person's understanding of

571d. The court relied on the due process clause and the equal protection clause to mandate
ar,pointment of counsel for indigent insanity acquittees. Id.
5 In re Tiffen, 646 N.E.2d 285 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
591d. at 287. (requiring a court to assess one's mental ability or intelligence or understanding of the
p_urpose of counsel).
""MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN I § 10-609 (2000). Voluntary admission criteria include
requirements that an individual have a mental disorder, is susceptible to care, understands the
nature of request for admission, is able to give continuous assent to retention, and is able to ask for
release.Id. § 1O-609(c)(I)-(5).
61Postponement may be granted for good cause or by agreement of the parties for seven days. MD.
REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 21.01.08(A)(2) (2001).
62Rashid v. J.B., 410 N.W.2d 530, 532 (N.D. 1987).
63 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979).
64Garaas v. D.S., 263 N.W.2d 114, 120 (N.D. 1978).
65T.Z. v. R.Z., 415 N.W.2d 486, 488 (N.D. 1987). See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
(1975) (discussing the waiver of counsel in criminal proceedings).
66T.Z, 415 N.W.2d at 487.
671d. at 488.
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the ramifications of his decision to proceed pro se. 68 The court must make an
inquiry to assess mental ability, intelligence, or understanding of the purpose of
counsel in order for such waiver of counsel to be valid. 69 Because involun~
civil commitment to a mental institution is "a massive curtailment of liberty" 0
and is recognized as a more intrusive exercise of state ~ower than criminal
incarceration due to the indefinite confinement possibility, I waiver of counsel
should be cautiously exercised.
It might be suggested that if a mentally ill person's opinion regarding forced
hospitalization is unclear or unobtainable, the attorney should seek guidance
from a substitute decision maker. For example, the mentally ill person's family
or close friends could speak on his behalf to advise the attorney on whether or
not to oppose the involuntary hospitalization. Several problems arise in turning
to substitute decision making judgment. Family and friends may disagree as to
what is the best interest of the person. Additionally, it may be difficult to
establish what decision the patient would make if he were competent to do SO.72
There is tension when a substitute decision maker enters the fray in terms of
understanding the patient's best interest and view toward forced hospitalization.
Family and friends may in good faith disagree as to what the patient would want
if competent to speak. While a review of medical decision-making, living will
statutes/3 and guardianship statutes may have suggestions for the person to tum
to for specific decisions, there remains the question of what the mentally ill
person's view is on the decision of psychiatric hospitalization. The United States
Supreme Court recognized in the important decision on the right to die that there
is no automatic assurance that the view of close family members will necessarily
be the same as the patient's would have been.74 Consequently, the important and
significant decision of forced psychiatric treatment should be viewed with great
respect and caution. Unless the mentally ill person knowingly and intelligently
accepts the inpatient psychiatric hospitalization, in all other situations counsel for
the patient should zealously oppose such course of action and demand clear and

681n

re Tiffin, 646 N.E.2d 285, 287 (IlL App. Ct. 1995) (remarking that without such a finding, the
af,pellate court would find reversible error).
6/d. (reversing order of commitment due to court's failure to inquire into respondent's knowledge
of the consequences of wai ving his right to counsel).
70yitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980) (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509
(1972».
71Honor v. Yamuchi, 820 S.W.2d 267, 269 (1991). See also Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396
(1968) (stating that where the state undertakes to act in parens patriae for juveniles and mentally
deficient persons, it has the inescapable duty to vouchsafe due process).
72See In Re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1989).
73MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN 1 § 5-601 (2000). See also Conservatorship of Waltz, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 436 (CaL Ct. App. 1986) (discussing voluntary informed consent for ECT treatment); R.H.
Lockwood, Annotation Mental Competency of Patient to Consent to Surgical Operation of Medical
Treatment, 25 A.L.R 3d 1439 (1969 & Supp. 1997).
74Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 461 U.S. 261, 286 (1990) (relying on the
wishes of the patient and not the decision of the close family members as to the desire to have Iifesustaining treatment withdrawn).

2002]

GIVING A VOICE TO THE SILENT MENTALLY ILL CUENT

613

convincing evidence at the hearing that forced hospitalization is necessary and
appropriate.
Several years later, the Sugreme Court extended its analysis of the social
The United States Supreme Court, although
stigma in Addington v. Texas
permitting a parent to make the decision to commit his child to a psychiatric
hospital, does recognize that the child has a substantial liberty interest in not
being confined unnecessarily and that commitment sometimes produces adverse
social consequences for the child. 76 These opinions again bolster the notion that
advocacy for discharge from psychiatric confinement is appropriate and just.
The decision making process for a client under a disability is complicated but
clear. It is complicated in that the attorney must ascertain the client's wishes
toward psychiatric hospitalization. Even after a good faith effort is made to
determine the client's position, occasionally the client's position remains unclear
or is not stated. The attorney at the civil commitment hearing, however, has no
time for delay or indecision and must act quickly, advocating for discharge. In
some situations, the attorney representing a child in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding may be tempted to ignore the client's decision and substitute his own
judgment. Scholars, however, have clearly articulated the belief that neither the
lawyer nor state officials may substitute their will for that of the child. 77 Thus,
the attorney should follow the wishes of his client at the civil commitment
hearing. When those wishes are unobtainable, the attorney should oppose the
hospital request for involuntary confinement and maintain the integrity of the
adversarial process. The similarities between the criminal defendant and civil
commitment respondent are clear. For example, in both instances one's freedom
is at stake. Therefore, the role of counsel should first and foremost be to obtain
freedom and zealously advocate against the loss of liberty. A court correctly
noted that "[ w]hen a defendant engages a lawyer or has one assigned to him he
has but one simple and understandable object; he wants to be free.,,78 This view
should permeate every phase of the lawyer's role in the civil commitment arena.

IV. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The effective assistance of counsel for a mentally ill person confronting
involuntary confinement requires court guidance.
The Supreme Court
recognized in Strickland v. Washington that the right to counsel includes the right
75441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) This case held that the gove~ment in a civil commitment hearing is
constitutionally required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is
mentally ill and dangerous. [d. at 433.
76parham v. J.R, 442 U.S. 584 (1979). See also Donald H. Stone, The Civil Commitment Process
for Juveniles: An Empirical Study, 65 U. DET. L. REv. 679 (1988).
77WALLACE J. MLYNIEC, WHO DECIDES: DECISION MAKING IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER, ABA Criminal
Justice Section (Rodner J. Uphoff, ed.) (1995); see also Auclair v. Auclair, 730 A.2d 1260 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1999) (discussing right to counsel for children in divorce and custody proceedings).
78Marquez v. Presbyterian Hospital in the City of New York, 608 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1994) (quoting LEVY, 9 RECORD OF THE ASSN. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 215,
220).
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to effective assistance of counsee9 The Court explained that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel, and
"[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced ajust result.,,80

v.

THE ROLE OF COUNSEL

The attorney representing a mentally ill person at the commitment hearing
has a grave responsibility. Often the attorney is the only voice speaking on
behalf of the disabled person, especially in seeking discharge from confinement
in the hospital. Compounding the task, the attorney typically enters the realm of
representation the morning of the scheduled civil commitment hearing often with
inadequate preparation time to obtain a full and complete understanding of the
client's views toward civil commitment into the psychiatric hospital.
Furthermore, the testimony at the civil commitment hearing is normally provided
by a hospital psychiatrist who has been treating the person since arrival at the
hospital and personally examined him within forty-eight hours of the hearing. 8l
The hearing relies heavily on the testimony of the hospital psychiatrist. 82 Rarely
is an independent psychiatrist offered to counter the hospital psychiatrist's
opinion that the patient needs inpatient care or treatment and presents a danger to
the life or safety of the individual or others. 83 Consequently, the legal
representation by an attorney is one of the most significant rights a mentally ill
person is afforded at a civil commitment hearing. The attorney's role is to
challenge the basis of the application for involuntary admission84 and elicit facts
and opinions challenging the need for hospitalization. In addition, the attorney
should advocate that a less restrictive form of intervention is consistent with the
welfare and safety of the individual,85
The role of counsel in representing persons with mental illness at involuntary
civil commitment hearings is viewed in one of two diverse ways. At one end of
the spectrum is the traditional adversarial role of counsel. In the adversarial role,
the commitment hearing is viewed in the same light as a criminal trial, as is seen
in the Lessard decision. This is true, regardless of whether the attorney believes
the mentally ill person would benefit from forced hospitalization or whether the
79

466 U.S. 668 (1984) (involving a criminal defendant who pied gUilty in a Florida court to capital
murder).
SOld. at 686 (holding that the proper test is whether a reasonable probability exists that but for
counsel's errors the result of the proceeding would have been different). See also In re Hutchinson,
454 A.2d 1008, lOll (pa. 1982) (finding that when reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the court must examine the record of the proceedings to ascertain whether counsel's
actions had a reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's interest).
81See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 21.01.09E (2001).
82See id.
83See id. § 21.01.09F.
84See id. § 21.01.03. The application seeking involuntary admission can be obtained by any
individual with a legitimate interest in the welfare of the individual. Id. § 21.01.03A(l).
85/d. § 21.01.09F(5).
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mentally ill person would improve more quickly if hospitalized against his will
for a period of time. The attorney's role is to represent his client's expressed
wishes.
At the other extreme, legal representation may be viewed as a guardian role,
in which the attorney determines what is in the mentally ill person's best interest
and seeks such an outcome. 86 For example, if it is in the person's best interest to
be treated as an inpatient of a psychiatric hospital, the guardian would articulate
this position to the administrative law judge who would then determine whether
or not to confine the person as an involuntary patient in the hospital. The
guardian role severely undermines the nature of the civil commitment process,
which is designed as adversarial. Maintaining the adversarial climate of the
hearing is vital to learning the truth and ensuring that the administrative law
judge receives all relevant information, both pros and cons regarding the need for
involuntary confinement, and to protect against improper loss of liberty of the
mentally ill person.
The role of counsel at the civil commitment hearing is further complicated in
situations in which the mentally ill person is either silent or incapable of
expressing his wishes regarding hospitalization. In cases where the client is
competent to express his or her wishes to counsel, the attorney can take on the
traditional adversary role with more ease. However, when the client is silent or
incompetent to express his views, attorneys tum to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct for guidance. s7
To better understand the client-lawyer relationship in the context of the civil
commitment hearing for a mentally ill person, Rule 1.14 (Client under a
Disability) states as follows:
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions
in connection with the representation is impaired, whether because of
minority, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall,
as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer
relationship with the client.
(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other
protective action with respect to a client only when the lawyer
reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's
own interest. 88

The reading of sections (a) and (b) above raises more questions than answers
in understanding the role of counsel in civil commitment hearings. Rule 1.14
requires the lawyer to maintain "as far as reasonably possible ... a normal client86See State ex rei. Children, Youth & Family Dep't. v. George F., 964 P.2d 158 (N.M. App. 1998)
(arising out of a guardian ad litem's duty to represent and protect the best interest of a child, as
opposed to following the instructions of his client). See also Buckler v. Buckler, 466 S.E.2d 556
fYV. Va. 1995) (discussing West Virginia's statute on the role of the attorney in representing a client
under a disability, which is modeled after Rule 1.14 of the A.B.A. Rules of Professional Conduct).
87Natalie Wolf, The Ethical Dilemmas Faced by Attorneys Representing the Mentally III in Civil
Commitment Proceedings, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 163 (1992).
88MoDEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (200 I).
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lawyer relationship with the client.,,89 "The normal client-lawyer relationship is
based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is
capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client ... suffers
from a mental disorder or disability, however, maintaining the ordinary clientlawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects." 90 Rule 1.2(a) of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct defines the scope of a normal client-lawyer
relationship as one in which "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation," and thus generally favors client
autonomy.91
In situations where an attorney has a reasonable and objective basis to doubt
a client's competency to make a decision and the lawyer's actions appear contrary
to the client's stated decision, the lawyer who acts in good faith and contrary to
the client's decision must demonstrate, at a minimum, an objective and
reasonable basis for believing that the client cannot act in his own interest. 92 The
lawyer's duty to exercise "independent professional judgment',93 is particularly
compelling when the client is disabled. The position an attorney advances at the
civil commitment hearing, that of seeking discharge from confinement, should be
respected and encouraged, especially in such a complicated and stressful setting.
Courts have recognized that in situations "where the client is thought to be
incompetent an especially heavy and delicate responsibility falls upon his
lawyer.,,94 The lawyer who represents a client under a disability may need to
make decisions for his client. 9 However, the court in Aumann noted that the
lawyer should act with care to "safeguard and advance the interests of his
client.,,96 The zealous opposition of involuntary and forced psychiatric
hospitalization and possible subsequent forced medication97 does advance the
interests of his client. 98 Such persons avoid loss of liberty and the stigma of
forced involuntary hospitalization, as well as the ability to participate in a
meaningful way in their course of psychiatric treatment. 99 This is what a zealous
lawyer promotes and protects when the voice in opposition to forced
hospitalization is clearly heard.

89/d.

9Old. at cmt. I.
"
91MoDEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2001).
92Red Dog v. State, 625 A.2d 245, 247 (Del. 1993) (noting that a lawyer may be under a duty to
af.peal for a capital murder defendant if the defendant is incapable of making intelligent decisions).
9 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2001).
94State v. Aumann, 265 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Iowa 1978) (holding that an attorney may pursue an
appeal without his incompetent client's permission).
95l d.
96ld.
97See MD. CODE ANN., MENTAL HEALTH § 1O-708(b) (Supp. 2001). A clinical review panel can
approve involuntary medication for a mentally-iII patient involuntarily committed to a psychiatric
hospital. ld.
98 See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds by 414
U.S. 473 (1974).
99 l d.
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In a legal dispute between divorced parents as to where their child, a
mentally-retarded adult, was to reside, the New Jersey Supreme Court looked at
the standard for determining the capacity of an incompetent person to decide
where to live and the role of appointed counsel in guardianship proceedings. 'oo
The court noted that the role of counsel for the disabled woman "is not to
determine whether the client is competent to make a decision, but to advocate the
decision that the client makes.,,101 The court, however, warned that the role of
counsel does not extend to advocating decisions that are patently absurd or that
pose undue risk for the health, safety, and welfare of the client. 102
When a mentally ill person is confronted with involuntary civil commitment
to a psychiatric hospital, an attorney seeking release may be faced with an
uncertain or unclear housing or treatment program. For example, a mentally ill
person may not have an outpatient treatment plan in place or may refuse all
outpatient treatment plans. Furthermore, the mentally ill client in some situations
may not have a suitable housing plan to present at the hearing. As a result, an
attorney who seeks discharge for a silent client or one who is unable to advise his
lawyer of his view may be seeking discharge from the hospital to a non-existent
housing arrangement and a non-existent outpatient treatment plan. The question
that confronts the attorney at this stage is whether advocating for release puts the
mentally ill person at undue risk of harm. 103
One view as to the action an attorney might undertake, as provided in Rule
1. 14(b), is to allow the lawyer "to take ... protective action with respect to the
client."I04 A suggestion of seeking appointment of a legal guardian to provide
substitute decision making for the client is, however, likely to result in the client
being involuntarily committed. Assuming that it is in the client's best interest to
be involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital for purposes of treatment,
does this end the discussion? One must never lose sight of the significant loss of
liberty and freedom that occur during involuntary commitment to a psychiatric
hospital. The attorney in the adversarial model of the civil commitment hearing
must maintain the traditional role of counsel in zealously advocating for
discharge of the silent or incompetent client. The integrity of the civil
commitment hearing, adversarial in nature, demands nothing less.
The
appointment of a legal guardian is practically impossible because civil
commitment hearings are usually held within ten days of arrival in the hospital,105
and the attorney becomes involved usually the day before or the day of the civil
commitment hearing. Therefore, in practical terms, there is insufficient time to
appoint a legal guardian before the hearing.
The active and attentive attorney who seeks discharge at the hearing, as
opposed to passively concurring to the involuntary hospitalization, benefits all
l00In re MR, 638 A.2d 1274, 1276 (N.J. 1994).
101ld. at 1284.
102ld at 1284-85.
103See id.
104MODEL RULES OF PROF' L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b) (2001).
105See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 21.01.08A(1)(a) (2001).
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individuals involved in the civil commitment process. A psychiatrist or
psychologist is required to demonstrate that there is a need for inpatient
hospitalization as a result of dangerous behavior. 106 The administrative law judge
must be convinced by clear and convincing evidence that "[t]here is no available,
less restrictive form of intervention that is consistent with the welfare and safety
of the individual.,,107 Without zealous advocacy on the part of the lawyer, it is
unlikely that a clear and full picture of the mentally ill person's psychiatric
treatment and housing needs will be demonstrated. The risk is that zealous
advocacy may lead to discharge of mentally ill persons into the community. The
safety net, of course, is that an administrative law judge will make the decision
only after hearing evidence in an adversarial hearing in which a finding is made
that the patient does not meet the criteria for inpatient hospitalization. 108 The
New Jersey case of In re M.R. cautioned against advocacy if it would pose an
undue risk of harm to the client. 109 However, the risk of harm to the client cannot
be viewed in a vacuum without also recognizing the harm of involuntarily
commitment to a psychiatric hospital. The stigma attached to a civil commitment
on a person's medical record might adversely affect employment, as well as other
aspects of a person's life. For example, licensing for lawyers, teacher
certification, as well as relationships in the community are adversely affected by
the label of having been involuntarily committed. llo Rule 1.14 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct should offer clear guidance that in the context of
the representation of the mentally ill in a civil commitment hearing, the lawyer
shall maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship. The responsibility of the
lawyer, unless directed otherwise by one's client, should be to oppose civil
commitment and seek release. This view would maintain the integrity of the
lawyer's advocacy role as well as the adversarial nature of the civil commitment
hearing. As long as civil commitment is involuntary, involving loss of freedom
and liberty, the lawyer's role should be to seek discharge for all silent and
incompetent clients. The right to counsel "prior to involuntary commitment [is]
basic to the accuracy of the truth finding function."lll The "loss of liberty and
social sti?matization are substantial and parallel [to] those at risk in the criminal
context." 12

VI. THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
An intriguing question is what an attorney should do when a client's
expressed wishes are incoherent, vague, or confused. For example, during a
client interview, an attorney might ask whether the client wishes to remain in the
100ld.

§ 21.01.09E-F.
§ 21.01.09F(5).
108ld. § 21.01.09F.
109
638 A.2d 1274, 1284-85 (N.J. 1994).
110 See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds by
414 U.S. 473 (1974).
lllDorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. 725, 741 (D. Md. 1977).
ll2ln re Richard A., 771 A.2d 572, 576 (N.H. 2001).
107ld.
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hospital. The client may express an interest in leaving but still be unsure because
of uncertain housing arrangements. The subject of an involuntary commitment
proceeding should be afforded the opportunity to have "the guiding hand of legal
counsel at every step of the proceedings."II3 Inpatient decisions regarding
release or retention, consequently, need to be made.
Another line of inquiry between lawyer and client might include discussions
of allegations of dangerous behavior. The attorney might inquire about claims
that the client made a recent overt attempt to harm himself, and the client might
deny or minimize such danger. As part of the lawyer's investigation, he may be
persuaded that the risk of harm to the client is great and discharge from the
hospital at this time might place the client at risk. If the client's expressed wish is
to be discharged, should the lawyer act in accordance with his client's expressed
wishes (advocacy model) and pursue the request to be discharged? In the
alternative, should the attorney operate in what the attorney believes is in the
client's best interest (best interest model) and possibly reject the request to be
discharged? Or, should the lawyer do what the lawyer believes the client would
desire if the client were capable of competently instructing the attorney
(substituted judgment model)? In understanding whose judgment to follow, it
depends on whether the lawyer's proper role is that of the advocacy model, the
best interest model, or the substitute judgment model. Scholarly guidance yields
no consensus about how a lawyer should represent a client whose competency is
questionable.
Courts have determined that the attorney in an involuntary commitment
hearing should act as an advocate or "adversary counsel.,,114 For a lawyer to
remain passive in the face of procedural improprieties is "intolerable abuse of the
duty to ensure stringent protection of constitutional and statutory rightS.,,1I5 An
attorney representing a mentally ill person at a hearing may determine that
significant procedural violations exist as they relate to the individual taken into
confinement,116 and the decision of whether to raise the issue may be dictated by
how the attorney sees his role. The attorney who sees his role under the best
interest model and believes confinement is in the best interest of the person may
forego raising a significant procedural violation affecting due process,
rationalizing that to raise such a matter may result in the administrative law judge
ordering the release of the individual from the inpatient facility.1I7 On the other
hand, if the attorney adopts the advocacy model, the procedural due process
violation is zealously advocated to the judge, and release is sought, regardless of
whether release is in the person's best interest. The view that a lawyer's role is to
113Honor v. Yamuchi, 820 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Ark. 1991) (citing Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393
(10th Cir. 1968».
114 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1097-98 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds by
414 U.S. 473 (1974). See Franklin J. Hickman et aI., Preparation & Trial of a Civil Commitment
Case, 5 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 281 (1981).
115Quesnell v. State, 517 P.2d 568, 574 (Wash. 1973).
II~D. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 21.01.09G(6) (2001).
mid. § 21.01.09G(3).
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argue against commitment regardless of the petitioner's need of treatment 118 is
the only true way to insure that the truth arises from the testimony and the
administrative law judge hears various perspectives and ultimately rules in an
enlightened manner.
One must never lose sight of the fact that involuntary civil commitment
deprives a citizen of freedom and liberty.1I9 The right to counsel is essential to
120
protecting a citizen's due process rightS.
In the civil commitment process,
attorneys are often confused about their role, wavering between the traditional
advocate role and the inclination to act as a guardian. The role of counsel in the
criminal justice arena is worthy of review and comparison, recognizing that the
attorney's role in a criminal representation is to provide a full defense. 121 This is
true even for a client whom the attorney knows to be gUilty.122 Nevertheless, in
the civil commitment context, some attorneys wince at the notion of opposing
confinement for clients who are silent or incapable of expressing their views
about hospitalization.
One scholar offered the suggestion that, in comparison with criminal defense,
the ethical guidelines governing situations where an attorney is representing a
mentally disabled client are "vague" and "contradictory.,,123 In both the criminal
justice and civil commitment system, a person is threatened with loss of liberty,
and there is a possibility for abuse by the state, making the role of the attorney
particularly important in protecting the citizen's rights. 124 Many attorneys
substitute their own judgment (substituted judgment role) for that of their client
by "deciding what is best for the client and acting accordingly.,,125 Again, the
attorney who seeks release in all situations, unless competently directed by one's
client to do otherwise, will insure that the adversarial system of civil commitment
will be protected and the client will not be hospitalized when neither
inappropriate nor when a less restrictive alternative to hospitalization is
appropriate.
When the attorney zealously opposes involuntary hospitalization, "each party
at the hearing presents its position, and a neutral fact finder synthesizes the
IISSee Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (involving transfer of a state prisoner to a psychiatric
institution in which the court required that prior to transfer an adversariaI hearing was required,
including right to counsel).
119See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1102 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds by
414 U.S. 473 (1974).
120Id. at 1097-98.
121Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84
YALEL.J. 1540, 1550 (1975).
1221d.

123NataIie Wolf, The Ethical Dilemmas Faced by Attorneys Representing the Mentally III in Civil
Commitment Proceedings, 6 OED. J. LEGAL ETHICS 163, 163 (1992). The author notes that the
Model Rules require an attorney to maintain as normal a relationship as possible, yet authorizes the
attorney to act as a de facto guardian, if necessary, and require the attorney to make decisions on
behalf of his client and in his client's best interest when his client is incompetent to make
judgments for himself or herself because of mental disability. [d. at 170-71.
1241d. at 169.
1251d. at 172.
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conflicting information and determines the truth.,,126 The attorney zealously
advocating at the hearing through cross-examination of the state's witness will
paint a full picture of the client's needs and create "the greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of the truth.,,127 Furthermore, attorneys who adopt the
advocate role serve as a check on a system characterized by rushed hearings 128
and psychiatric opinions seeking commitment that are frequently based solely on
129
exaggerated behavior contained in initial commitment petitions.
The advocate
130
because studies have shown that
role is preferable to the guardian role
commitment is more likely in the absence of adversary counse1. 131 The over
commitment of mentally ill patients is serious because many are committed
involuntarily when they do not need treatment in an inpatient hospital setting. 132
Furthermore, the criteria used to determine the need for inpatient psychiatric
hospitalization, specifically the clear and imminent danger to self or others
criteria, is extremely difficult to predict, resulting in inaccurate predictions of
dangerousness with a considerable margin of error. 133 Decreasing unnecessary
commitments is also important in promoting the fundamental right not to be
deprived of liberty absent a compelling reason. 134
To prevent commitment rates from increasing and to insure that only those
mentally ill and dangerous persons who need treatment and are unable to
appropriately receive it on an outpatient basis obtain appropriate treatment, the
attorney must recognize his role as a zealous advocate opposing involuntary
psychiatric hospitalization. The attorney's responsibility is to offer alternatives to
inpatient hospitalization, vigorously cross-examine the state's expert witnesses,
raise significant procedural violations, and demand clear and convincing
evidence that the patient poses imminent danger to himself or others. To protect
the liberty interest so valued by all citizens, the attorney must advocate discharge
from inpatient hospitalization and challenge all forced psychiatric treatment. The
result will be improved outpatient treatment programs, more appropriate housing
alternatives for the mentally ill, and inpatient treatment only when no other less
restrictive form of intervention is appropriate.
The quality of counsel in civil commitment hearings will be highest when
attorneys see their role as zealous advocates opposing involuntary civil
I 26/d. at 176. See also Virginia Aldidge Hiday, The Attorney's Role in Involuntary Civil
Commitment, 60 N.C. L. REv. 1027 (1982).
127Wolf, supra note 123, at 177. See also JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367
(James H. Chadbourne ed., 1974).
128Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1265, 1284
(1974).
129Virginia Aldidge Hiday, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment: Changes, Effects,
Determinants, 5 J. PSYCillATRY & L. 551, 557 (1977).
13OWolf, supra note 123, at 163.
I3ISee Hiday, supra note 129, at 560.
I32See Note, supra note 121, at 1553-56.
I33See John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary Admissibility,
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901 (2000).
I34See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds by
414 U.S. 473 (1974).
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commitment. "The quality of counsel remains the single most important factor in
the disposition of cases in involuntary civil commitment systems.,,135 Rule 1.14
of the· ABA Model Rules should be modified in the context of the civil
commitment hearing. Current Rule 1. 14(a) should delete the following
underlined portion and require the attorney to oppose inpatient hospitalization in
the civil commitment hearing.
Rule 1.14 Client Under Disability
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions
in connection with the representation is impaired, whether because of
minority, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall,
as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer
relationship with the client.
(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other
protective action with respect to a client only when the lawyer
reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's
own interest. 136

VII. CLIENT COMPETENCY
The attorney of a mentally ill person facing involuntary civil commitment
initially should determine if his client is in favor of or opposed to inpatient
psychiatric hospitalization. After this position is ascertained, the attorney should
pursue the client's stated goal. However, often the mentally ill person is
diagnosed with mental disorders such as dementia,137 and as a result has
developed multiple cognitive deficits. The deficits are manifested by memory
impairment, such as an impaired ability to learn new information or to recall
previously learned information. 138 Other patients may be diagnosed with a
paranoid type of schizophrenia, characterized by delusions and frequent auditory
hallucinations. 139 In such cases, the attorney may be unsure of his client's
competency to make informed decisions regarding the legal representation. If so,
where does the attorney turn for guidance to determine how to understand
competency and how to communicate to a person incapable of fully
understanding the extent of the legal proceeding of civil commitment?
The guidance provided in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for
representing the client under a disability is less than helpful in the civil
commitment setting. Under Rule 1. 14(b), a lawyer may seek the appointment of
a guardian or take other protective action only when the lawyer reasonably

135Michael Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental
Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 49 (1992).
136 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (200 1).
137AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC

1994).
138Id.
139/d.

& STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed.
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believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest. 140 Even
if an attorney in a civil commitment hearing considers seeking an appointment of
a legal guardian, several practical problems arise. First, the time element is of
grave concern and significance. Often hearings are held within ten days of the
patient arriving in the hospital,141 and the attorney often meets his client for the
first time the morning of the hearing. The appointment of a guardian involves a
court proceeding, though there is usually insufficient time to delay the civil
commitment hearing in order for the guardianship hearing to occur. In the
context of representing the elderly who are in questionable competence, a legal
scholar accurately points out that "there is a general presumption in practice, and
increasingly in theory, in favor of representing a questionably competent client
without going through the elaborate procedures required for a formal
appointment of a guardian or other substitute decision maker.,,142 Another
choice, although unreasonable, would be for the attorney to refuse to represent
the silent or incompetent client. However, for the attorney to decline the legal
representation of the client facing loss of liberty due to forced hospitalization will
leave these "vulnerable individuals unrepresented.,,'43
Commentary to Model Rule 1.14 acknowledges that "the fact that a client
suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client
with attention and respect."I44 The commentary acknowledge that if the person
has no guardian or legal representative, "the lawyer often must act as de facto
guardian." 145 How does the attorney proceed in the civil commitment arena in
advocating for or against hospitalization for the silent or incompetent client?
Drawing upon the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, "the lawyer shall, as far
as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the
client."I46 Attorneys who represent the mentally ill client at the civil commitment
hearing, unless directed to the contrary by the competent client, should zealously
advocate for discharge from the hospital in all situations. The reasonable course
of action at the adversarial hearing is for the administrative law judge to
determine whether to involuntarily confine the mentally ill person to a
psychiatric hospital. Anything less than zealous advocacy seeking release would
not be in the patient's best interest. If after hearing all the testimony and
evidence, the judge is persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that all five
criteria for hospitalization have been met the patient will be involuntarily
hospitalized. 147 For the attorney representing the patient to take any position
I~ODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (200 I).
141MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 21.01.08(A)(1)(a) (2001).
142Robert Rubinson, Construction of Client Competence and Theories of Practice, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
121, 127 (1999).
143/d.

144MoDEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. (200 I).
145/d; see also Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the
Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515.
146MODEL RULES OF PROF' L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2001).
147MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 21.01.09F. (2001). Criteria for admission include "(1) [t]he individual
has a mental disorder; (2) [t]he individual needs inpatient care or treatment; (3) [t]he individual
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other than advocating release, along with forcing the opposing side· to prove the
need for hospitalization, is contrary to the best interest of the patient and conflicts
with the role of the attorney in seeking freedom and avoiding unwanted and
unnecessary hospitalization.1 48 The following data was collected from question
eleven of The Role of Attorney at Involuntary Admission Hearing Survey. The
question stated: after interviewing your client in preparation for the N A hearing,
if you determine that your client is unable to competently express hislher wishes
regarding remaining in the hospital or being released from the hospital at the IV A
hearing, do you proceed as if your client:
(a)
(b)
(c)

desires to remain in the hospital.
desires to be immediately discharged from the hospital.
..
149
h as no oplDlon.

One hundred percent of the responses was for the attorney to take the
position that his client desires to be immediately discharged from the hospital. 150
This powerful data supports the notion that seeking discharge and demanding
proof of the need for hospitalization is not only worthy but also in the best
interest of the mentally ill client.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The right to counsel is provided in each state for a person facing involuntary
civil commitment; 151 however, lawyers have difficulty defining the proper
advocacy function. 152 State statutes appointing counsel in civil commitment
hearings vary in explanation of the lawyer's role, several simply stating the right
to "court-appointed counsel,,,153 "to be represented by an attorney,,,154 or "to be
represented by counsel.,,155 However, other state statutes encourage zealous
advocac~, as seen in the instruction to be a vigorous advocate on behalf of the
person, I 6 or to "be a vigorous advocate on behalf of his client. ,,157 Some state
statutes, as in Virginia, explain "the role of the attorney shall be to represent the
wishes of his client, to the extent possible,,,158 mirroring the client under a
presents a danger to the life or safety of the individual or of others; (4) [tjhe individual is unable or
unwilling to be admitted voluntarily; (5) [t]here is no available, less restrictive form of intervention .
... " [d.
148See generally Stone, supra note 19 (providing an extensive discussion of competency to provide
consent and other topics related to civil commitment).
149Stone, supra note 8, at question 11.
150ld. See infra Appendix 2, Graph #11. See also Bruce Winick, Competency to Consent to
Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REV. 15 (1991) (containing
an excellent discussion on competency to consent to treatment).
151MICHAEL PERLIN, LAW & MENTAL DISABILITY 69 (1994).
I 52ld.
1530HIOREV. CODE ANN. § 5122.l5(A)(4) (West 1994).
154Mo. ANN. STAT § 632.335(2)(1) (West 2000).
155IND. CODE ANN. § 12-26-2-2(b)(4) (West 1997).
15~INN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.07(2c)(4) (West 1998).
157MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-102(8)(d) (1999).
158VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Michie 1996).
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disability rule outlined in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 159 One state
statute, however, clearly declares that the attorney representing a respondent shall
not serve as a guardian ad litem and shall oppose involuntary care and treatment
unless the respondent directs the attorney not to oppose it. l60 The enlightened
Tennessee state legislature recognizes the importance of the attorney in opposing
involuntary hospitalization, thus ensuring only those most in need of forced
hospitalization receive such treatment.

15~ODEL RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2001).
I~NN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-419 (2001).
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Appendix 1
ROLE OF ATTORNEY AT INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION (IVA) HEARING SURVEY
Professor Donald H. Stone
University of Baltimore School of Law
2000
2.

Sex: _ _ __

I.

Age: _ __

3.

Number of years in practice: _ _ _ __

4.

Number of years representing clients at IV A hearings: _ _ __

5.

Are you: (check one)

__ employed fuB-time with the Office of the Public Defender.
_ _ employed part-time with the Office of the Public Defender.
_ _ in private practice.

6.

The IVA hearings in which you represent clients are primarily at: (check one)
___ state psychiatric hospitals.
___ private psychiatric hospitals.

7.

In the last 12 months, approximately how many clients have you represented at IVA hearings?

8.

During the client interview, in preparation for the IV A hearing, in what percentage of these
cases do you discuss with your client:
a. postponement

---_%

b. voluntary admission - - - _ %
9.

As you interview your client in preparation for the IV A hearing, if you determine that your
client is unable to comprehend the nature of the hearing, in what percentage of these cases do
you discuss with the hospital presenter, immediately prior to the IV A hearing, the option of
postponement?
%
Explain: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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10. As you interview your client in preparation for the IV A hearing, if you detennine that your
client is unable or unwilling to communicate with you, in what percentage of these cases do
you discuss with the hospital presenter, immediately prior to the IV A hearing, the option of
postponement?
%
Explmn: _______________________________________________________

II. After interviewing your client in preparation for the IV A hearing, if you detennine your client
is unable to competently express hislher wishes regarding remmning in the hospital or being
released from the hospital at the IV A hearing, do you proceed as if your client: (please check
one):
a.

desires to remmn in the hospital.

b.

desires to be immediately discharged from the hospital.

c.

has no opinion.

12. If you checked II.c. above, please respond to the following question: At the IV A hearing, do
you see your role at the hearing as: (check one)
a.

the client's attorney.

b. the guardian ad litem.
c. other. (please explmn) ________________________________
13. If you are unable to detennine your client's view regarding hislher desires and wishes at the
IV A hearing, and there is clear and convincing evidence presented at the IV A hearing that
your client presents a danger to the life or safety of himselflherself or others if released at the
hearing, do you: (check one)
a.

advocate at the hearing for your client's release from the hospital.

b.

advocate at the hearing that your client should be involuntarily
admitted to the hospital.

c.

take a neutral position.

14. If you are unable to determine your client's view regarding hislher desires and wishes at the
IV A hearing, and you believe that your client presents a high degree of danger to the life or
safety of himselflherself or others if released at the hearing, do you: (check one)
a.

advocate at the hearing for your client's release from the hospital.

b.

advocate at the hearing that your client should be involuntarily
admitted to the hospital.

c.

take a neutral position.
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15. If you are unable to detennine your client's view regarding hislher desires and wishes at the
IV A hearing, and you believe that your client presents a high degree of danger to the life or
safety of himselflherself or others if released at the hearing, and you discover a significant
procedural violation that should result in the client being released at the hearing, do you:
(check one)
a.

raise it to the administrative law judge (ALJ) and advocate for
release.

b.

raise it to the AU and not advocate for release.

c.

not raise it at the IV A hearing.

16. At the IV A hearing when evidence heard by the AU is clear and convincing that your client
meets all five criteria for retention and your client desires release from the hospital, do you:
(check one)
a.

make a closing argument seeking release.

b.

submit on the record without making a closing argument.

c.

make a closing argument that it would be in your client's best
interest to be retained.

17. Should the role of the attorney at an IV A hearing be defined by statute to include the role and
responsibility of the attorney? If so, please explain how you would define the role:

18. In representing a juvenile at an IV A hearing, do you see your role as being different than when
you represent an adult if the juvenile client is:
a.

under age 7:

Yes

No _ __

b.

between age 7 - age 14:

Yes

No _ __

c.

over age 14 - age 18:

Yes

No _ __

19. On an average hospital hearing docket, what is the percentage of clients scheduled for an IV A
hearing:
a.

that sign a voluntary admission?

--_%

b.

that have their hearing postponed?

--_%

c.

that are released prior to hearing?

--_%

d.

that have a full hearing on the merits?

--_%
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20. Which procedural violations most often results in obtaining client's release: (please list the top
three)

I.

2.
3.

21.

a.

Average length of IV A hearing: ____ minutes

b.

Average length of time you prepare for IV A hearing: ____ minutes

c.

Average length of time you spend interviewing your client in preparation for
the IV A hearing:
minutes

d.

Average length of time you spend reviewing medical records:
minutes

e.

Average length of time you spend interviewing treating psychiatrist:
_ _ _ _ minutes

f.

Average length of time you spend interviewing other witnesses:
minutes

g.

Other activity and/or preparation for IV A hearing: _ _ _ minutes

Explain:

22.

Suggestions for changes in IVA hearing: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

23.

Suggestions for changes in IV A laws: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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24. Are you in favor of out-patient commitment in which a patient would be ordered to comply
with medication and treatment? Yes ___ No _ __
Explain: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

I understand that this questionnaire that I am completing for Donald H. Stone will be
used as data for his research and scholarly writing. I give Mr. Stone pennission to use direct quotations from this questionnaire at his discretion. I understand that I will retain anonymity in the
writing of the article.

Date:
Name (please print)
Telephone: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Signature
Address: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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Graph #6

Question 6 - Setting of IVA Hearings
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Questions 9 & 10 - Option of Postponement Discussed
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Graph #11

Question 11- Client Unable to Express Wishes, How to
Proceed
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Graph #13

Question 13 - Unable to Determine Client's View and Evidence
Client Dangerous
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Graph #14

Question 14 - Unable to Determine Client's View and Attorney Believes Client
Dangerous
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Question 16 - All Criteria Met for Retention, Attorney at Closing
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Graph#18A

Question 18A - Representing Juveniles: Different Attorney Role « age 7)
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Question 186 - Representing Juveniles: Different Attorney Role (age 7-14)
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Graph#18C

Question 18C - Representing Juveniles: Different Attorney Role (age 14-18)
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